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THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR 
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
by Ruti Teitel• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The beginning of the modem moment is identified by at least one 
philosopher in the response to the Lisbon earthquake in 17 5 5 .1 Rather than 
merely accepting the catastrophe as misfortune or fate, a new response 
emerged: the disaster was characterized as "injustice," a failure of human, 
not divine, intervention. In this about-face, the deadly consequences of the 
Lisbon earthquake were seen as the result of a failure of human action; the 
insecure architecture of the city's apartment buildings was the fault line to 
blame. 
A similar adoption of the language of justice characterized the 
modem human rights movement, which commenced in the response to 
World War II. This international response was noteworthy for its legal 
character; it emphasized criminal accountability, its symbols the 
International Military Tribunal and the Nuremberg proceedings. Indeed, the 
ongoing legacy of the postwar response is evinced in the contemporary 
moment. As we near the century's end, the recurring manifestations of the 
call for the protection of international human rights are persistently and 
overwhelmingly criminal in nature: the convening of the Hague Tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,2 the entrenchment of the 
Nuremberg-style International Criminal Court in the recent Rome 
agreement, 3 as well as the transnational proceedings initiated against General 
Augusto Pinochet, the former Chilean dictator.4 Contemporary responses to 
tragic atrocities identify criminal accountability in the international legal 
system with the rule oflaw. 
This Article explores contemporary developments in international 
human rights in analyzing the emergence of international criminal law as an 
arch response to atrocity in the name of human rights. A critical question 
• 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Ernst C. Stiefel Professor of Comparative Law, New York Law School. 
See Judith N. Shklar, The Faces oflnjustice 51-54 (1990). 
See infra note 35. 
See infra note 7. 
See infra note 31. 
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raised by this response is, what are the aims of international criminal law in 
its advancement of human rights? If international criminal justice is intended 
to protect human rights, to what extent is its role the accurate representation 
of and retribution for past wrongs? Or is its role to transform societal 
understandings in advancing the protection of human rights? And if the 
latter, how exactly do criminal processes effect the liberal transformation of 
transitional states emerging from authoritarian rule? 
There appear to be two alternative normative paradigms advanced 
by the use of international criminal law: "politics of universalism" and 
"politics of difference." A universalistic politics drives the postwar 
paradigm, in which both principles of jurisdiction and substantive criminal 
law are shaped by a standard of "humanity." Challenging the historical 
universalist paradigm is a more contemporary paradigm, which advances an 
identity politics. In the politics of difference, international criminal law 
moves beyond the conventional role of criminal justice of isolating 
individual wrongdoing to emphasize the representation of individual victims 
and their persecution on the basis of group affiliation. In contemporary 
proceedings, international criminal law both affirms individual rights to 
equal protection, and through its considerations of policy, also represents the 
collective. As is elaborated more fully below, these alternative paradigms are 
in some tension. This is apparent in how the purposes and role of 
international criminal law mediate the universal and the particular. 
Ultimately, contemporary attempts to model a coherent conception of 
international criminal justice culminate in a chiefly limited process-based 
conception of the rule of law. 
What is international criminal law's potential for advancing human 
rights? To what extent can the difficult project of transformation, of moving 
to a more liberal politics, be accomplished through international criminal 
processes? This Article explores various paradigms of international criminal 
justice with an eye to a better understanding of the potential of criminal law 
in the contemporary moment. 
II. THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALISM 
Consider the genealogy of modem human rights law. Historically, 
international criminal institutions and processes have been dedicated to 
representing the universal in human rights. As the prevailing scholarly 
accounts suggest, the beginning of the modem international human rights 
movement occurred in the postwar period, with the Universal Declaration of 
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Human Rights following closely the establishment of the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.5 Moreover, these understandings of human 
rights as universal share affinities with the constitutional developments that 
accompanied the beginning of the international human rights movement. 6 
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg has long been a 
potent symbol of law's universality. The nature of the proceedings, the 
substantive charges brought and adjudicated, in particular "crimes against 
humanity" as defined in the Nuremberg Charter, and the subsequent trials all 
embodied understandings of universal standards of humanity.7 A central 
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 
Aug. 8, 1945, art. 1, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284. 
6. See Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights 16-17 (1990) (observing that human rights 
began appearing in constitutions during the postwar period and that "universalization" is 
reflected in national constitutions). 
7. Compare Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of 
War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, reprinted in 1 
Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Court: A Step Toward World Peace 488 
(1980), with Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 5, art. 6(c). Article 
6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter defines "crimes against humanity" as 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane 
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the 
war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in 
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the 
country where perpetrated. 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 5, art. 6(c). 
Article 7 of the recent Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court expands 
the definition of "crimes against humanity": 
[T]he following acts when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) 
Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) 
Imprisonment ... ; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery ... ; (h) 
Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, 
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender ... grounds ... ; (i) 
Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; and (k) 
Other inhumane acts of a similar character .... 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, art. 7, U.N. Doc. 
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charge at Nuremberg was "crimes against humanity," proscribing inhumane 
acts committed against civilians, whether or not in the context of the war. 8 
Despite the enormity of the war, the Tribunal's normative legacy is one of 
the core concepts of universal human dignity.9 
Though the commitment was to the advancement of "universal" 
values, the natural law theory animating the postwar legal 
responses-whether in their criminal or their constitutional form-was 
tempered by the various legal and political traditions prevailing in the 
postwar period. In part, the relevant traditions derived from the 
circumstances of the Allied response to Nazi Germany. Accordingly, what 
was deemed "universal" at the time was informed by Allied traditions and 
by the explicit, critical response to repressive fascism. Accordingly, law's 
response and its turn to the universal reflected the then-reigning view that 
the perversion of Nazi rule derived from moral relativism implicit in that 
regime's understanding oflegality. The repression of the Nazi regime was 
associated with its putative positivist philosophy oflaw.10 Accordingly, the 
direct response to totalitarianism was the move to natural law concepts 
implicated by the universal rights violations adjudicated in the international 
proceedings that were convened. This conception of universal human rights 
also reflected the ascendance of American rights traditions in postwar 
occupied Europe. Both the then-emerging international human rights 
movement and the wave of constitutionalism shared a common theory of 
rights: rights conceptualized as traditional Anglo-American rights at law, 
that is, rights as norms backed by sanctions. 11 
On this account, the postwar procedures are best understood as 
concretizing both a particular view of rights, a conception that was a product 
of its times, and lhe belief in modernity and law. Postwar justice was 
conceived of as a system of judicially enforced rights. Whereas traditionally 
the predicate to enforceable rights was a functioning nation-state, however, 
A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
8. See generally Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (1992). 
9. See Ruti Teitel, Nuremberg and Its Legacy, Fifty Years Later, in War Crimes: The 
Legacy of Nuremberg 44 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999). 
10. Though scholars of the period suggest thejudiciary's philosophy of law under the 
Reich was considerably more complicated. See, e.g., Ingo Millier, Hitler's Justice: The 
Courts of the Third Reich 68-81 (Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., Harvard Univ. Press 
1991); Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political 
Transformation, 106 Yale L.J. 2009, 2025 & n.52 (1997). 
11. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 218 (Clarendon Press 1994) (1961). 
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the postwar responses exemplified the landmark uses of a new legal system 
by internationalizing a traditional, domestic form of rights protection through 
judicial processes. The modern international human rights regime sought to 
construct human rights as universal by casting individual rights and 
responsibilities in terms of universalizing human characteristics. The 
adjudication of human rights violations in the "crimes against humanity" 
proceedings in a manner that encompassed natural law understandings 
demonstrates this phenomenon. 12 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the extent to which the 
asserted universalist conception of human rights is animated by and 
contingent upon its particular political context. Despite pretensions to 
universality, the wartime political context had a pervasive and ongoing force; 
it operated as a substantive restrictive principle, limiting the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction. Thus, prosecutions in the Nuremberg proceedings were limited 
to inhumane acts with a demonstrable nexus to war. 13 Even under the rubric 
of universality, the understanding of human rights is limited in multiple 
respects. For example, where "universal" offenses are adjudicated in the 
domestic context, these adjudications are constrained by conventional 
jurisdictional principles such as territoriality nationality. 
The postwar conception of the judicialized human rights model 
persists to the present day. That protection of human rights is still thought 
to be attainable through international punishment processes shows the 
continuing dominance of the postwar paradigm and its central symbols. 
Nevertheless, such criminal proceedings have been few and far between, 
despite numerous genocidal campaigns and the commission of other 
atrocities in this century. The adjudication of genocide has largely been 
limited to the Nuremberg trials14 and the more contemporary atrocities 
relating to the Balkans conflict. Indeed, the international proceedings that 
were convened as a result of ethnic cleansing in Europe, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, was the first such effort since 
the World War II-related trials. 15 The sporadic application of the Genocide 
12. See Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (2d ed. 1986). 
13. For a discussion of this prudential self-limiting in the scope of the postwar trials, 
see Taylor, supra note 8, at 113-15. 
14. See Beth Van Schaack, The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide 
Convention's Blind Spot, 106 Yale L.J. 2259, 2259 (1997). 
15. See infra note 38. 
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Convention16 and the failure to adjudicate cases of political genocide17 relate 
to a distinctive postwar history. The general lack of rights enforcement by 
means of criminal proceedings contributes to a pervasive sense that the 
international human rights regime is flawed, even as it also suggests that the 
judicial, procedural feature of the universal conception of rights retains 
ongoing significance today. 
Ill. THE MOVE TO POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 
The move away from the notion of a unitary, universalizing 
conception of human rights to a broader understanding that comprehends a 
more complex understanding of identity began, paradoxically, with the Cold 
War. The political realities of the period led to rights differentiation and the 
attempt to draw distinctions among rights, in particular between political and 
civil as opposed to economic and social rights. A debate emerged about the 
meaning of''real" human rights, challenging the postwar rights model. The 
debate reflected the existence of normative dissent not apparent at the 
beginning of the human rights movement. The conflicts focused in particular 
on the conception of the state and the extent of its commitments to and 
agenda regarding economic security. Despite the assertion of the equivalence 
of political and economic rights in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the rights divide was stark, as seen in bitter debates in the United 
Nations, 18 as well as in the ultimate adoption of separate covenants to 
enforce political and economic rights. 19 Moreover, the dominance of the 
judicialized rights paradigm further obscured the comparability of these 
rights. Rights differentiation challenged the prevailing rights model insofar 
as the model had emphasized the protection, through judicial processes and 
apparatuses, of political norms considered universal. This challenge to the 
postwar rights model, raising issues of enforceability as well as the pwported 
16. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). 
17. See Van Schaack, supra note 11, at 2269-72. 
18. See generally Seminar on the Realization of Economi~ and Social Rights 
contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 5-13, U.N. Doc. STffAO/HR/31 
(1967). 
19. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 
3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). 
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antinomy regarding so-called "positive" and ''negative" rights, went to the 
very meaning of international human rights. Understandings of the 
justiciability and enforcement of rights ordinarily associated with domestic 
law played a significant role in defining rights on the international scene.20 
Ultimately, an apparent rights hierarchy emerged, with a rights conception 
considered so different from the first wave in the postwar period that it has 
been readily understood to comprise another "generation" ofrights.21 
Contemporary adjudications of international human rights violations 
in the courts show a more complex view of the second generation rights 
model. These proceedings reflect a move away from the postwar search for 
universal definitions and values to particularist human rights norms, 
understandings that are linked to particular national contexts and political 
conflicts. In a number of countries, the struggle over whether and how to 
limit the application of the concept of "universality" in the postwar human 
rights regime went hand in hand with related limiting jurisdictional 
principles based on particularist notions of identity, such as nationality and 
ethnicity. Whereas offenses at Nuremberg were prosecuted as "crimes 
against humanity" on a universalizing basis, in the subsequent national trials 
of the 1950s and 1960s these offenses were prosecuted in terms of the 
collective.22 This change was not necessarily embraced.23 
The shift to a particularized notion of rights marks a number of 
deliberations over adjudicating the "crime against humanity" offense within 
national jurisdictions throughout Europe. In the 1960s, a debate ensued in 
Germany over whether, and in what fashion, to continue the World War 11-
related trials. Once again, this debate revealed the tension in international 
criminal law between the universal and the particular, juxtaposing 
universalizing ideas of jurisdiction against more particular notions of justice 
20. See Maurice Cranston, What Are Human Rights? 84-85 (1962). 
21. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International law: Protection of the Rights of 
Individuals Rather Than States, 32 Am. U. L. Rev. I, 32 (1982) (distinguishing the first 
generation of rights, civil and political rights, from economic, social, and cultural rights, 
which comprise the second generation). 
22. In Israel, for example, Eichmann was prosecuted for commission of "crime[s] 
against the Jewish people." See Cr. C. ( Jm.) 40/61 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 
1961, reprinted in 56 Am. J. Int') L. 805 (1962). 
23. For example, for some scholars the representation in the trial of Adolf Eichmann 
of a more contextualized account of the wartime atrocities as committed "against the Jewish 
people" was incomplete. See, e.g., Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the 
Banality ofEvil 275-76 (Penguin Books 1994) (1963). 
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as resolved in national statutes of limitations. Ultimately, the wartime-era 
trials were continued, but with significant limits. Indeed, the salient 
restrictive principles included status--for example, nationality of the 
parties-and motive. While jurisdictional principles are often considered 
largely procedural, in the international arena these principles express critical 
normative values; they illuminate the nature of the relation oflaw to politics 
and help explicate what norms might transcend a state's transient political 
consensus. 
In another European trial for World War II-related atrocities, the 
prosecution in France of Klaus Barbie in the late 1980s for wartime 
deportations of civilians raised again the extent to which asserted universal 
human rights are reconcilable with national traditions and legal cultures. In 
the 1960s, France incorporated the Nuremberg definition of"crimes against 
humanity" into its criminal law-a domestic, national law incorporation of 
concepts of universality. 24 The incorporation of international standards into 
national law had important ramifications. Applying the principle of universal 
jurisdiction implied by wronging "humanity" created tension with 
preexisting limiting principles of jurisdiction, and therefore necessitated 
changing fundamental jurisdictional principles. For purposes of the "crime 
against humanity," the twenty-year time limit that would ordinarily have 
applied to all offenses in France, no matter how heinous, was tolled, 
allowing the prosecution of Barbie for World War II offenses to go forward 
in 1987. This case illustrates the extent to which prosecutions of war crimes, 
even years after the fact, continue to be shaped by a state's particular legal 
culture and the ambient political circumstances. 
International jurisdiction offers a space for the representation of 
human rights values. Adjudicating "crimes against humanity" implies 
displacing the domestic law principles that would ordinarily constrain 
prosecution and signals an attempt to denationalize and depoliticize, and 
hence universalize, the relevant offenses. Yet, notwithstanding the passage 
of time, depoliticizing the prosecution of wartime crimes of the Vichy 
regime proved difficult. Despite the attempt to reconcile universal criminal 
justice within a national regime, crimes are adjudicated within the 
parameters of a distinct political context, jurisdiction, and related principles. 
While the adjudication of "crimes against humanity" historically implied 
features of normative universalism, its treatment in the Barbie trial in 
contemporary France ultimately represented ano~her politics-identity 
24. See C. Pen., arts. 211-1, 212-1 (Fr.). 
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politics.2s Political differences over the trial emerged in a partisan debate in 
France, the broad contours of which were historical. The controversy 
centered around the meaning of "crimes against humanity" as incorporated 
in French law: namely, whether the prosecution of crimes against humanity 
could go beyond the atrocities committed against "innocent Jews" to include 
those committed against members of the Resistance. 26 In its review, France's 
High Court moved beyond the status-based conceptualization of protected 
classes to a more complex understanding of the scope of the "humanity" 
crime, focusing not on the victims' status but on the perpetrators' motives 
in behavior against the backdrop of state policy.27 Yet when policy 
predominated, leading to expansion of the humanity charge to include crimes 
against members of the Resistance, the move appeared politically motivated 
and was controversial in the country, opening a debate about the subjects of 
the humanity crime.28 The national cases adjudicating "crimes against 
humanity" reinterpreted the term's meaning in the context of the changing 
rights regime. 
The emergence of a third generation of rights, rights that 
comprehend collectives and ethnicity rights, marks the more recent 
developments.29 Conferring the imprimatur of international law on 
communities defined along ethnic and religious lines challenged the hitherto 
normative emphasis on the universal in human rights. The move from 
considerations of status to those of individual action ultimately refocuses 
attention on policy, linking the individual to the collective. 
25. See Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of 
Klaus Barbie, 98 Yale L.J. 1321, 1381 (1989). 
26. See Federation Nationale des Deportes et Intemes Resistants et Patriotes and 
Others v. Barbie, 78 I.L.R. 125, 139-40 (Fr., Cass. crim., Dec. 20, 1985). 
27. Id. 
28. See Alain Finkielkraut, Remembering in Vain: The Klaus Barbie Trial and Crimes 
Against Humanity 19-20 (Roxanne Lapidus & Sima Godfrey trans., Columbia Univ. Press 
1992). 
29. See Sohn, supra note 21, at 48. 
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IV. HUMAN RIGHTS GLOBALIZATION 
In the contemporary moment, international human rights norms have 
"gone global"; their protection is envisioned as somehow autonomous, no 
longer bounded by international institutions or even the affected nation-
states. Contemporary instantiations of international criminal justice seem to 
operate independent of conventional connections such as territoriality, 
effects, or nationality, whether of offender or victim.30 The expansion 
beyond these traditional bases for jurisdiction suggests new directions for 
normative principles for assuming jurisdiction. On their face, rights norms 
appear to be developed in an unsystematic manner. Jurisdiction is often 
taken or assumed by states with apparently remote connections to the 
underlying controversy, in the name of human rights. 
Accordingly, the contemporary emergence of rights globalization is 
highlighted not only by the ad hoc international tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but also by occasional national cases, such as 
Spain's extradition request of General Pinochet for human rights violations 
perpetrated in Chile under military rule.31 In addition, Germany indicted 
Dusko Tadic for commission of war crimes in the Balkans prior to turning 
him over to the International Tribunal.32 The assumption of jurisdiction on 
the basis of "crimes against humanity" jurisdiction appears to constitute an 
act of solidarity. Normative instantiation, in the name of human rights, is 
being promoted independent of the affected states, in the name of global rule 
of law and justice. The contemporary globalization of rights enforcement, 
albeit in sporadic adjudications, challenges both the immediate postwar 
emphasis on international institutions as well as more particularist, local 
understandings of justice. 
30. There are traditional jurisdictional principles that connect states to criminal 
prosecution. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States§ 402 
( 1987). The Comment to section 402 provides that a state has jurisdiction to prescribe Jaw 
under general principles of: (l) territoriality; (2) nationality; (3) effects within the territory; 
(4) protection of the state's security; (5) passive personality. Id. cmts. a-g. 
31. See In Re Pinochet, Opinions of the Lords of Appeal for Judgment in the Cause 
(Jan. 15, 1999) (visited Feb. 6, 1999) <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
off ... pa/Id l 99899/ldjudgmt/jd990115/pinoO l.htm>. 
32. See The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic alkla "Du/e," Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion 
and Judgment, pt. 1.8., iii! 6-9 (May 7, 1997) (visited May 11, 1999) <http://www.un.org/ 
icty/tadic/trialc2/jugement-e/970507jt.htm>. 
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Human rights globalization through international criminal law 
enforcement suggests a profound change in the sources, content, and form 
of rights norms.33 The enforcement of international human rights norms 
through judicial proceedings that occur outside the traditional spaces of 
contestation vividly demonstrates this change. To some extent, these 
adjudications signal the universal in human rights, but they also generate 
complex issues as the concept of universality interacts with the legal 
traditions and political agreements of particular countries, pointing to a 
changing relationship among law, politics, and justice in the international 
arena. 
Globalization has paradoxical ramifications for international 
criminal justice. In some sense, it implies closer connections between 
countries' criminal justice systems, as reflected in the adoption of 
conventions and extradition treaties that facilitate transnational cooperation. 
At the same time, there is a change in traditional understandings of 
sovereignty with respect to its relation to law. As the bounds of traditional 
sovereignty are penetrated, expansion of criminal jurisdiction would appear 
to follow. Yet globalization also implies other contemporary changes that 
point in another direction: toward the breakdown in conventional ideas of 
causation, agency, and relatedly, individual responsibility.34 Systematic 
repression implies more than individual responsibility; indeed, at the level 
of the collective and the regime, it often implies that more than one regime 
is responsible. Although jurisdiction over international human rights 
violations may well be expanded as a theoretical matter, its application is 
stressed by other developments. The principle of individual responsibility at 
the core of postwar international criminal justice cannot adequately take 
account of systematic repression. Accordingly, globalization in rights 
enforcement puts great pressure on the postwar judicial rights model, 
spurring the further elaboration of various restrictive principles, which 
delimit the potential for the construction of human rights in and through the 
criminal law. 
33. Similar developments are seen in the globalization of the civil sanctions 
instantiating human rights law. See Proposals of the Hague Conference and their Effect on 
Efforts to Enforce International Human Rights Through Adjudication (submitted by Int'I 
Assoc. of Democratic Lawyers), in Work Doc. No. 117, Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, Nov. 13, 1998. 
34. See Samuel Schemer, Individual Responsibility in a Global Age, in Contemporary 
Political and Social Philosophy 219, 228-29 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1995). 
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V. MEDIATING THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR 
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
[30:285 
Consider the role of international criminal justice in responding to 
the grave political violence that has characterized much of the twentieth 
century. International criminal justice is thought to have a normative role in 
responding to illiberal identity politics-law is thought the apt response to 
communal violence and disorder. International criminal justice's normative 
potential is evident in the ongoing trials at the Hague, where criminal justice 
is being used both to respond to "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans and 
Rwanda and to reconcile the conflicts in these areas. The new international 
criminal law statutes, whether the ad hoc codifications being applied in the 
Hague Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda35 or the statute for 
the proposed permanent International Criminal Court,36 involve various 
constructs that attempt to bridge the universal and the particular in identity 
politics. 
With respect to the Balkans, the goal of the tribunal was profoundly 
ambitious: to move from communal conflict to establish peace and the rule 
of law,37 whereby punishment under the law would hold individuals 
35. Statute of the International Tribunal [for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Serious Violations oflntemational Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia], Annex to Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 
of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Supp. for Apr.-June 
1993, at 134-38, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda [for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and 
Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States], Annex to S.C. 
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) 
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
36. See Rome Statute, supra note 7. 
37. The Security Council's decision to establish the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (later expanded to include Rwanda) was motivated not only by an intent 
to punish and to prosecute, see Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) 'lf'lf 3-4, Annex to Letter Dated 24 May 
1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/1994/674 (1994) [hereinafter Final Report], but also as a measure to bring about peace. 
See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993), 48th Sess., Supp. for Apr.-June 1993, '1!'1110, 22, U.N. Doc. S/25704 
(1993); S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 
(1993). This use of judicial proceedings to bring about peace had no precedent in the 
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responsible in an effort to limit' private vengeance. When a U.N. 
Commission of Experts found that there was a campaign of "ethnic 
cleansing,"38 the expectation was that international criminal law would 
establish individual accountability to break supposed cycles of ethnic 
retribution. In the words of the Tribunal's prosecutor, "[a]bsolving nations 
of collective guilt through the attribution of individual responsibility is an 
essential means of countering the misinformation and indoctrination which 
breeds ethnic and religious hatred."39 To that end, crimes against humanity 
were defined to encompass widespread and systematic inhumane acts 
"directed against any civilian population" including "persecutions on 
political, racial and religious grounds. ,.40 Where intent to destroy "a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group" could be shown, persecution was also 
prosecutable as "genocide."41 
The international proceedings at the Hague raised the question of 
whether the tribunals were up to the task of constructing a norm responsive 
to ethnic persecution. Universalist ideas were extended far beyond the 
postwar consensus. Thus, crimes against humanity-whether or not 
committed in the course of international armed conflict-were prosecuted 
independent of state lines. This was most vividly demonstrated in the 
adjudication of the attempted genocide of approximately one million Tutsi 
and Hutu moderates in Rwanda. The persecution was committed entirely in 
that country's internal conflict, and yet these crimes were adjudicated in an 
international forurn.42 In these proceedings, universalist norms appear to 
have transcended traditional limits on adjudicating international offenses. 
In their conventional role, the strength of criminal proceedings is 
that they bring out the significance of individual action, which advances 
principles of liberalism. The criminal law's focus on individual 
responsibility represents an important liberal principle: the significance of 
postwar paradigm. 
38. See Annex IV, The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing 17, 21-36, in Annexes to the Final 
Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
780 (1992), Vol. I, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2(Vol.I)/Annex IV (1994). 
39. See Response to the Motion of the Defence on the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal at 
23, (filed July 7, 1995), The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a "Dute," Case No. IT-94-IT. 
40. See ICTY Statute, supra note 35, art. 5. 
41. See id. art. 4,, 2. See also Final Report, supra note 37,, 182 (concluding that the 
actions perpetrated in Op~na Prijedor against non-Serbs would likely be confinned in court 
as constituting genocide). 
42. See ICTR Statute, supra note 35. 
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agency and responsibility. Nevertheless, such emphasis on ascribing 
individual accountability in war crimes trials is of questionable value 
because individual proceedings ultimately obscure the profound role of 
systemic policy in repression. Because of their emphasis on individual 
accountability and because they are ''bottom up," contemporary war crimes 
trials show a notable evasion of politics. Accordingly, international and 
global adjudications ultimately obscure the significance of systemic 
persecution. For example, since the construct of a crime against humanity 
highlights the universal in the offense, when persecution is adjudicated at the 
Hague Tribunal as an offense against the entire international community, it 
is construed in a profoundly apolitical way. Further, where the proceedings 
are convened in a political vacuum, apparently independent of traditional 
national jurisdictions, the criminal proceedings obscure the significance of 
state policies and other structural causes behind these crimes.43 In 
contemporary international criminal law, the constructs of "genocide" and 
"crimes against humanity" incorporate highly nuanced understandings of the 
individual and the collective. By their very definitions, these offenses link 
the individual and the collective. Offenses against groups incorporate a 
conception of cultural and ethnic identity into the definition of the offense, 
and individuals are prosecuted for committing such offenses. Thus, for 
example, the contemporary trials at the ad hoc tribunals at the Hague take 
note of ethnicity through principles that emphasize persecutory motive, if 
only to transcend it. 
These contemporary criminal constructs raise again the question 
posed earlier in this Article of what our intuitions are regarding the 
appropriate purposes of international criminal law. To what extent do we 
expect it to simply represent past wrongdoing; or to what extent is it 
intended to be transformative of that past wrongdoing? In this regard, 
contemporary human rights proceedings risk emphasizing ethno-conscious 
elements of persecution that, to some extent, would affirm, and perhaps even 
in some small way reenact, past persecution.44 The normative change in the 
rule of law is thought to be a twofold symbol of equality of protection: that 
43. On structural causes see Robert W. Gordon, Undoing Historical Injustice, in 
Justice and Injustice in Law and Legal Theory 35 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Keams eds., 
1996). 
44. For discussion of the performative in legal responses, see Judith Butler, Excitable 
Speech: A Politics of the Performative 43-44 (1997). 
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is, of equal application of the law both to perpetrators and to victims-and 
hence all citizens in the society. 
Nevertheless, the universal and the particular are somehow in 
tension here. While new law affirms and seemingly protects individual 
rights, the motive principle plays a restrictive role, limiting the reach of the 
offense as against humanity and sharply constraining the application of 
international law. This results from the often crushing burden of proof, 
making prosecution difficult. Moreover, the insistence on proof of individual 
motive can be misleading, as it obscures the extent to which persecutory 
policy is a social and above all political construct. The parameters of this 
potentially universalizing construct undermine the possibility of adequately 
representing the extent to which the architecture of genocide is political.45 
VI. MILLENNIAL VISIONS: JUSTICE INTO THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
In light of the above constraints, the question remains: what is the 
potential for international criminal justice in human rights? In some sense 
the use of criminal law to enforce human rights is a millennial vision, 
reaffirmed by the contemporary consensus on establishing a new 
international institution, the permanent International Criminal Court. The 
permanent International Criminal Court appears to entrench the postwar 
tribunal for the end of the century and the next millennium. Yet going 
beyond the construct at Nuremberg, the statute for the International Criminal 
Court reveals the dynamic tension discussed here between the politics of 
universalism and identity politics in international criminal justice.46 
In the contemporary International Criminal Court, the role of 
international criminal justice is complex. At mid-century, the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg articulated an understanding of the rule of 
law reflecting the consensus of a small number of nation-states. Indeed, at 
the time, convening the International Military Tribunal was rationalized by 
the unavailability in occupied Europe of the ordinary nation-state rule oflaw 
regime. There was a lack of both sovereignty as it is conventionally 
understood and working judicial institutions. Whereas in the new global 
order, the traditional bases for jurisdiction have given way to an expansive, 
normative agenda. As previously discussed, the expansion of offenses for 
45. See generally Van Schaack, supra note 14. 
46. Rome Statute, supra note 7. 
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which jurisdiction is "universal" points to a similar expansion of 
transnational consensus. The charter for the new International Criminal 
Court extends the reach of international criminal law; there is a pronounced 
move from objective approaches to jurisdiction to more subjective, policy-
based principles. This is explicit in the expansion of the definition of"crimes 
against humanity,'"'7 and the use of international criminal law both to 
construct international human rights violations and to represent identity 
politics. Thus, for example, the new codifications reflect the change afoot in 
the social and legal construction of rights and rights violations. The tum to 
international criminal law to protect a pluralist identity politics is evident in 
the transformation of what counts as "persecution." The Rome Statute 
includes persecution on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
or gender grounds as a crime against humanity.48 In addition to establishing 
identities, the Rome Statute's codification of "crimes against humanity" 
encompasses crimes of the apartheid regime as well as the repressive policies 
of military juntas in Latin America and Africa,49 an eloquent recognition of 
profound contemporary political change. 
This change is also seen in the Rome Statute's heightened protection 
of women from sexual violence, with the codification of rape as a crime at 
several places in the statute.5° For example, the U.N. Expert's Report 
investigating rape and sexual assault in the former Yugoslavia concluded 
that several different avenues for prosecution were available to address the 
crime of rape or other sexual assaults. 51 The definitional requirements of 
additional material elements, in particular concerning intentionality, create 
different categories of war crimes. This raises the question of what 
difference it makes in how the perpetrators of these atrocities are prosecuted; 
does the resolution of this question depend upon the perceived purpose or 
purposes of international criminal law? The new codifications allow for 
47. See id. art. 7. 
48. See id. art. 7, '11 l(h). 
49. Enforced disappearances and apartheid are now codified as "crimes against 
humanity." See id. art. 7, 'll'll l(i), l(j). 
SO. "Crimes against humanity" includes "[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, ... or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity." Id. art. 
7, 'II l(g). Under the statute, rape is also a war crime, see id. art. 8, 'If 2(b)(xxii), and 
potentially a form of genocide. See id. art. 6(b)-(d). See infra notes 51-53. 
51. See Annex II, Rape and Sexual Assault: A legal Study 3, 5-9, in Annexes to the 
Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992), Vol. I, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2(Vol.I)/Annex II (1994). 
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alternative adjudications of wrongdoing: rape can be prosecuted as a "war 
crime";s2 as a "crime against humanity";s3 or as "genocide."s4 Where rape 
is prosecuted as a "war crime," the offense constitutes a limit on the waging 
of war. Where rape is prosecuted as a "crime against humanity," it 
emphasizes that at war or peace women are part of "humanity." Where rape 
is prosecuted as "genocide," it emphasizes the intersectionality of gender-
based violence with ethnic-based violence and shows how rape can serve as 
an instrumentality for group destruction.ss Ultimately, the availability of 
alternative adjudications necessitates asking once again, what is the purpose 
of international criminal justice? Is it the role of prosecutions to best 
represent past wrongdoing, or is its role to transform the past understandings 
so as to protect future human rights? 
Developments in human rights dating back to the postwar period 
affirm the notion that there is a growing normative consensus in the 
expansion of "crimes against humanity." Though punishment may well be 
ex post and occasional, even this largely symbolic condemnation expresses 
a sense of international accord. Many of these offenses had already been 
recognized as human rights violations at customary law, the most heinous 
known as jus cogens.s6 There is consensus on these most grave rights 
offenses, and hence universal jurisdiction. Under the new international rights 
regime, these offenses have been codified and ratified as conventional law, 
adding democratic-based legitimacy. For the first time since the immediate 
postwar period, there are renewed expectations of a shared international 
normative consensus. 
Contemporary developments suggest that international criminal law 
stands in fragile equipoise, its purposes hanging in the balance. Tension 
between the expression of the universal and particular is evident in 
52. See Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 8,, 2(b)(xxii). 
53. See id. art. 7,, l(g). See also The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. 
ICTR-96-4-T, pt. 7.7 (visited Feb. 1, 1999) <http://www.un.org/ictr/english/judgements/ 
akayesu.htrnl>. 
54. See Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 6(b)-(d). 
55. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, pt. 7.8. 
56. See Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources oflntemational Law, 47 Brit. 
Y.8. Int'! L. 273, 281-82 (1974-75); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, 
opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) 
(definingjus cogens as peremptory norm). For a discussion of these "peremptory norms from 
which no derogation by treaty is permitted," see Oscar Schachter, International Law in 
Theory and Practice 342-45 (1991). 
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contemporary institutional and statutory developments. Despite lofty 
universalizing goals of representation of racial, ethnic, and genderized 
violence, the danger is that the original construction is reaffirmed by the 
remedy, the equivocal representation of an illiberal politics.57 The risk in 
adjudicating the discrimination-based offense, of emphasizing the racial or 
ethnic in the offense, is that rights adjudication could reaffirm rabid and 
unchanging identity politics. Such criminal proceedings would backfire, 
affirming only the perverse and conservative message of an illiberal state. 
Illiberal identity politics should be exposed for what it is: a political and 
social construction. 
Accordingly, the new International Criminal Court, established to 
normalize international criminal justice at the century's end by using the law 
to respond to atrocities, ultimately raises the recurring question of what is the 
purpose and role of international criminal law in human rights. Undoubtedly, 
there is the message, albeit a thin one, of an isolated, discrete adherence to 
a procedural rule of law. Yet the global human rights regime constitutes a 
paradoxical normative order. Insofar as it attempts to represent an 
autonomous norm, free of national and political predicates, it is vulnerable. 
The sad history of the twentieth century reveals that the protection of human 
rights is most at risk when it lacks a legal and political matrix of a rule of law 
state. But the irony is that clearly making this point necessitates the rule-of-
law institutions of the working nation-state. Where there is no critical 
account ofrepressive illiberal identity politics, international criminal law can 
hardly serve to reconcile conflicts, nor to express the essential liberal 
message of transformation. 
57. See generally Butler, supra note 44. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
How to respond to grave injustice? If the modern moment begins 
with a change in the understanding of the potential ofhuman intervention in 
recognizing avertible tragedy, the postmodern moment implies recognition 
of the limits and contingency in its exercise. Yet, historically and in its more 
contemporary renaissance, international criminal law appears to have a role 
to play. The globalization of criminal law, though occasional and erratic, has 
a normative force. Wherever states adjudicate crimes against humanity or 
other universal offenses, these instantiations represent a consensus upon a 
rights-based limit on persecutory politics. Nevertheless, this largely symbolic 
and ex post normative order is lacking, removed from national contexts and 
thicker political constructs, international criminal processes offer only 
glimmerings of a transcendent rule oflaw. The resonance of this particular 
legal response in the contemporary moment derives from its potential to span 
universalist and particularist human rights values. Its transformative potential 
is in moving beyond notions of enduring ethnic conflict to express that what 
is at stake in the recurring and pervasive communal violence of this century 
are conflicts that are largely politically constructed, and, therefore, hopefully 
amenable to change. 

